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    We investigate the motives and consequences of the consolidation of 
cooperative banks (Shinkin) in Japan during the period 1984-2002. Our major 
findings are as follows. First, less profitable and less cost efficient banks are more 
likely to be an acquirer and a target, though even less profitable and less cost 
efficient banks are more likely to be a target rather than an acquirer. In addition, a 
larger bank is more likely to be an acquirer and smaller one a target. These results 
are consistent with the regulators’ motive for stabilizing the local banking system. 
Second, acquiring banks improved cost efficiency after the consolidation. M&As also 
raised the loan interest rate and improved profitability and X-efficiency particularly 
since the latter half of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the improvement of ROA after the 
merger was not sufficient to fill in the initial gap of the capital ratio between 
merging banks and peers, resulting in the deterioration of the capital ratio of 
consolidated banks relative to peers. M&As did not contribute to sufficiently 
stabilize the local banking system despite the regulators’ motive. Third, the 
consolidation tended to improve the profitability of merging banks when the 
difference in profitability and healthiness between acquiring banks and target 
banks were large, which is consistent with the relative efficiency hypothesis (e.g., 
Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey, 1997).   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Mergers and acquisitions among financial institutions have been accelerating 
over the last two decades across the world. In the U.S., a large number of 
commercial and savings banks were taken over by other depository institutions 
during the 1980s and especially after restrictions on intrastate and interstate 
banking were removed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994. Recently, financial conglomerates have emerged through a 
series of M&As after restrictions on securities and insurance businesses by banks 
were lifted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Service Modernization Act. In 
Europe, the emergence of the European Union in 1999 seems to have spurred 
consolidation of the financial services industry. In the crisis-hit Asian countries, 
foreign capital entry into the banking industry and government recapitalization 
promoted bank consolidation. In Japan, a variety of banks were merged during the 
1990s when most banks suffered from a huge amount of non-performing loans.   
These waves of mergers and acquisitions in the banking industries across the 
world raise important questions of whether mergers enhance the efficiency of 
surviving banks and contribute to the stabilization of the banking sector or just 
increase their market power in setting prices. A large number of studies attempt to 
resolve these questions by examining profitability, cost efficiency and market 
performance of merger survivors. Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) review 
existing research concerning the causes and consequences of the consolidation of the 
financial services industry. They point out that the evidence is consistent with 
increases in market power especially in the case of consolidation within the same 
market, improvements in profit efficiency and diversification of risks, but little or no 
cost efficiency improvement on average and potential costs to the financial system 
from increases in systemic risk or expansion of the financial safety net. However, 
most of the existing studies examine the consolidation among the U.S. or European 
financial institutions and little is known about the causes and consequences of 
financial consolidation outside the U.S. or Europe.   
     This paper investigates the causes and consequences of the consolidation 
among Japanese banks. Yamori (2005) reports that in Japan, the number of large, 
city banks remained at 13 during the 1980s but decreased almost by half to 7 in 
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not change over the last two decades (63 in 1980 and 64 in 2005), the number of 
second-tier regional banks decreased from 71 in 1980 to 48 in 2005. The number of 
credit banks (shinkin) also dropped from 462 in 1980 to 301 in 2005.   
Okada (2005) studied 10 mega-mergers among city banks during 1989-2000. 
She estimated X-inefficiency and analyzed stock market and credit derivatives 
market responses and profit measures (ROE and ROA), concluding that no 
improvement in X-inefficiency was observed but increases in cumulative excess 
stock returns and decreases in default probability were found. Her results suggest 
that the motivation of mega-mergers was not to improve efficiency but to take 
advantage of the government’s too-big-to-fail policy. Yamori, Harimaya and Kondo 
(2005) studied financial holding companies of regional banks and found that profit 
efficiency tended to increase when the market share in the region increased. Inoue 
(2003) and Yamori and Harimaya (2005) estimated the cost efficiency of shinkin 
banks. Using the observations of 33 mergers by shinkin banks over the period 
1989-98, Inoue (2003) found: 1) the cost efficiency of the acquirer was lower than the 
average of all shinkin banks, 2) it took 6 years to catch up with the cost efficiency, 
and 3) the improvement of cost efficiency after the merger was achieved by the 
reduction of personnel costs rather than the reduction of branches. Yamori and 
Harimaya (2005) used the shinkin bank data during 1998-2003 and analyzed the 
cost efficiency as of 2002. They found that the cost efficiency of those banks that had 
merged with other banks one year before was significantly lower than those banks 
that had not merged, while the cost efficiency of those banks that had merged two 
years and more before was higher but not significantly.   
This paper focuses on the consolidation among Japanese shinkin banks, which 
are deposit-taking cooperatives of small business whose objectives, set by the 
Shinkin Law, are to accept deposits from and make loans to member small firms. 
Compared with the preceding studies on the consolidation of Japanese banks, this 
paper comprehensively analyzes the causes and consequences of shinkin mergers in 
the following ways. First, we analyze motives of shinkin mergers as well as their 
consequences. Using a multinominal logit model, we investigate what type of a 
shinkin bank was more likely to be a target or an acquirer. Second, we investigate 
the effects of mergers on the profitability and healthiness as well as cost efficiency. 
If regulatory authorities promote bank consolidation to restore the safety and 
soundness of the banking system, it is important to examine whether bank 
consolidation improved bank healthiness or not. Finally, our observations are 
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bubble and post-bubble periods. There were 109 M&As by shinkin banks from 1984 
to 2002, of which 65 M&As data were available.     
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
motivation of bank mergers. Section 3 describes our data set. Section 4 presents the 
estimation results of the motivation of shinkin mergers. Section 5 shows the 
estimation results of the impacts mergers on profitability, market power, cost 
efficiency, healthiness and portfolio. Section 6 analyzes the link between the ex ante 
characteristics of acquirers and targets and the consequences of consolidation. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Background and History of Shinkin Banks 
    Shinkin banks are deposit-taking cooperative banks that specialize in financing 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) within a region. Just like city banks 
and regional banks, shinkin banks are protected by deposit insurance and subject to 
the capital adequacy requirements and other banking regulations and supervisions. 
Unlike city banks or regional banks, however, shinkin banks make loans mainly to 
the member SMEs who capitalize the shinkin banks. They can make loans to 
non-member SMEs, but they have to restrict the share of the loans to non-member 
SMEs below 20 percentage. The average ratio of loans to non-members is 5.9 % as of 
March, 2001.̍ On the other hand, they can accept deposits from anyone, while 
credit cooperatives (shinyou kumiai), another type of deposit-taking cooperative 
banks that specialize in SME financing, can accept deposits only from members. As 
of March, 2001, the share of deposits from non-members occupies 64.3%. Shinkin 
banks are regional financial institutions in the sense that they can make loans only 
to SMEs that operate within the same region as the shinkin banks.   
     Shinkin banks are generally smaller than city banks and tier-1 and tier-2 
regional banks and larger than credit cooperatives (shinyo kumiai). As of March 
2001, the averages of total assets are 434 billion yens for shinkin banks, 1,132 
billion yens for tier-2 regional banks, 3,216 billion yens for tier-1 regional banks, 
and 47,463 billion yens for city banks.̎ Shinkin banks occupy 13.8% share of total 
deposits by private banks, which is smaller than the shares of city banks (36.6%) 
and tier-1 regional banks (26.6%), but larger than the shares of agricultural 
cooperatives (10.5%), tier-2 regional banks (8.4%) and credit cooperatives (2.6%). 
They occupy 14.7% share of total loans to SMEs.     
      Shinkin banks were first established in 1951 when the Shinkin Bank Law 
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kumiai). In 1968, the Shinkin Bank Law was revised to raise the minimum capital, 
to enlarge the eligibility of members, to admit loans to non-members up to 20% of 
total loans and to strengthen the authorities of the representative meetings. In the 
same year, the Merger and Transformation of Financial Institutions Law was 
legislated to promote M&As among banks. After the legislation, a merger wave 
occurred. The number of shinkin banks decreased from 519 in 1968 to 456 in 1981. 
     In 1981, the Shinkin Law was again revised. Under the new Law, the 
regulations towards city banks on the amount of credit to one borrower and the 
disclosure were applied also to shinkin banks, During the 1980s, mergers among 
shinkin banks were rare. The number of shinkin banks was still 454 in 1989.     
After the agreement of the Basel Accord in 1988, capital adequacy 
requirements were introduced in Japan, though the regulations became effective 
from fiscal year 1992 ending in March 1993 after a five-year transition period. 
While internationally-operating banks, including all city banks and some regional 
banks, were required to hold capital more than 8% of risk-weighted assets, 
domestically-operating banks, including all shinkin banks, were required to hold  
capital more than 4% of total assets. For shinkin banks, capiatal is membership 
account that is composed mainly of initial contribution by members, legal reserves, 
and balance carried forward. As of March 2001, the average capital ratio of shinkin 
banks was 6.03%, while those of tier-1 and tier-2 regional banks that operate 
domestically are 4.10% and 4.18%, respectively. Among the domestically-operating 
banks, shinkin banks seem to have been relatively well capitalized.   
The collapse of land prices and share prices at the early 1990s seriously 
affected shinkin banks as well as city banks and regional banks. Two small credit 
cooperatives failed in 1994, followed by the failures of two large credit cooperatives 
and one large tier-2 regional bank in 1995. People were concerned about the 
soundness of Japanese financial institutions. The government responded to the 
emergence of the banking crisis by announcing a blanket guarantee to all the 
deposits and other liabilities of banks, including shinkin banks, in 1995. The 
government also required banks to disclose non-performing loans step by step. 
Shinkin banks lagged behind city banks and regional banks in the release of the 
amounts of non-performing loans. For example, city banks began to disclose loans to 
failed borrowers and loans in default for six months in 1993, while shinkin banks 
began to disclose the former in 1996 and the latter in 1998. The regulatory 
authorities, who were concerned about depositors’ panic triggered by the disclosure 
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banks and credit cooperatives than those on city banks and regional banks. 
Inadequate disclosure, coupled with no active market for equity, most likely 
resulted in weak market discipline to shinkin banks. 
     Though the highest decision-making body of shinkin banks is the general 
meeting of the whole members, it is actually replaced by the meeting of the 
representative members, who are usually elected by the managers and have weak 
incentives to monitor managers (e.g., Yamori, 2005). To overcome such a weak 
governance structure of shinkin banks, external audits have been required on 
shinkin banks since 1997 with exceptions for small shinkin banks. This 
requirement was strengthened in 2001. 
     The government enacted the Financial Rehabilitation Law and the Financial 
Function Strengthening Law in 1998, prompting capital injection to solvent banks 
and mergers and acquisitions of unhealthy banks. Though the government can 
recapitalize shinkin banks based on these laws, there has been no government 
recapitalization of shinkin banks until 2006. On the other hand, a large amount of 
financial assistance (1,595.6 billion yens) was made by the deposit insurance to 
those shinkin banks that merge or acquire failed shinkin banks from 1999 to 2002. 
Against the background of the government policy to reorganize shinkin banks, the 
number of shinkin banks drastically reduced to 301 in 2005 as stated above. 
 
3.  Hypotheses on the motives of bank consolidation 
 
This section reviews the hypothesis on the motives of bank consolidation. 
As Berger et al., (1999) points out, the primary motive for consolidation would 
be maximizing the value of shares owned by existing shareholders. Banks can 
maximize value either by increasing their market power in setting prices or by 
increasing their efficiency. Market power can be strengthened if two or more banks 
operating in the same market are consolidated and consequently the market 
becomes more concentrated. The improvement of efficiency can be achieved either 
by improving cost efficiency or changing product mix, given the market power. Cost 
efficiency will be improved if an efficient bank spreads its superior managerial skills 
to an inefficient bank by acquiring the latter. Profitability will be enhanced by 
superior risk management. Existing empirical evidences on the U.S. banks and 
thrifts support the value maximization hypothesis (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; 
Pilloff and Santomero, 1998; and Peristiani, 1992). 
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prefecture (i.e., in-market M&As), market power may be a potential benefit of 
shinkin consolidation. However, some caveats are necessary in applying the 
value-maximization hypothesis to the shinkin M&As for some reasons. First, 
shinkin banks are not corporations but cooperatives of small business. Therefore, 
shinkin banks may not exert its market power to raise loan interest rates even if 
bank consolidations make the loan market more concentrated. Second, equity of a 
shinkin bank is not traded at a market. Equity-holders (i.e., members) cannot 
realize capital gains by selling their equity at a shinkin bank. This fact may weaken 
the value-maximizing motive. Third, possibly due to the difficulty of assessing the 
equity values of shinkin banks, the equity of a target has been exchanged at 
one-for-one price with the equity of the consolidated bank for all the M&As that we 
could obtain the data on the exchange rates. Given such business practices, banks 
with a higher economic equity value may not want to acquire or be acquired with 
banks with a lower economic equity value. 
Besides the shareholders’ value-maximization motive, bank managers and 
regulatory authorities have different motives for consolidation. When corporate 
governance structures are weak, managers may be willing to acquire other banks 
for the purpose of empire-building. They may gain personal financial and 
non-financial gains from consolidated institutions. 
The government also plays a role in consolidation decisions from the viewpoint 
of competition policy or prudential regulation policy. The regulatory authorities may 
prevent bank consolidation to reduce the market power. On the other hand, during 
periods of financial crises, the government may promote bank consolidation among 
unhealthy or inefficient banks to restore the stability of the local banking system. 
For this aim, the government may explicitly or implicitly urge a large, weak bank to 
acquire a small, weak bank. Unhealthy, inefficient banks may be willing to respond 
to such a request because they benefit from a subsidized deposit rate. Because our 
sample period covers Japan’s banking crisis period of the 1990s, it is of particular 
interest whether bank consolidations were promoted by the government’s motive for 
restoring the financial stability. 
 
4.  Data and overview of shinkin mergers 
 
The data source of financial statements and mergers and acquisitions is 
Financial Statements of Shinkin Banks in Japan, edited by Financial Book 
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bank is legally surviving and a target if the bank has legally disappeared. Our 
dataset covers the period 1984-2002. For the details of the variables we use, see 
Appendix 1. 
We use three bank efficiency variables: current income as a proportion of 
assets (ROA), personal and non-personal expenses including taxes as a proportion 
of current income (cost ratio), and X-efficiency. While ROA and the cost ratio are 
simple and direct measures of profit and cost efficiency, respectively, they do not 
control for the changes in bank portfolios. To control for the mix of bank loans and 
other assets, we estimate X-efficiency using a standard a translog cost function. See 
Appendix 2 for the details of the estimation method. It should be noted, however, 
that estimating X-efficiency has some well-known difficulties. Suppose, for example, 
that some banks spend less resources to screen and monitor borrowers than others. 
The former banks may be estimated to be more X-efficient than the latter banks, 
because they incur a smaller amount of costs after controlling for the amounts of 
loans. If the former incurs larger loan losses due to poor screening and monitoring 
and report true amounts of losses, then we could estimate X-efficiency accurately by 
controlling for loan losses. However, it takes time for banks to recognize loan losses. 
Banks may not accurately report loan losses (especially under inadequate 
accounting standards like in Japan).̏ In sum, none of the three efficiency variables 
is complete. Though we prefer simple measures of ROA and the cost ratio, given the 
shortcomings of X-efficiency, we also report the results for X-efficiency. 
Table 1 shows the movements of the numbers of merges and acquisitions for 
the sample period. In 1984, there were 456 shinkin banks. Though there were only 2 
M&As until 1989, there were 52 M&As in the 1990s and 33 M&As from 2000 to 
2002. Due to such a large number of M&As, the number of shinkin banks decreased 
to 327 in 2002. Table 2 shows the descriptive sample statistics of the bank and 
market characteristics that we use in the following analyses. We compare the bank 
characteristics variables among the acquirers, targets, and peers. We define peers 
as those banks that have not been involved with M&As throughout the sample 
period. Table 2 suggests that targets and acquirers are less profitable, and more 
costly and less healthy than peers, though we do not control for macroeconomic 
shocks across different years in Table 2.̐
Figure 1 compares some characteristics of acquirers and targets as 
compared with peer banks, which were not an acquirer or a target throughout 
the sample periods. Denoting the year of M&As as period  , we take  t
  7differences of bank characteristics variables of acquirers and targets from peers 
for period  . We also calculate differences of bank 
characteristic variables of weighted averages of acquirers and targets from 
peers for period 
i t i + = ) 5 , 4 , , , , 4 , 5 ( − − = i
i t i + =   ) 1 , , , 4 , 5 ( − − − = i , where total assets of acquirers and 
targets are used as weights.̑ Only those banks whose data is available at the 
merger year and a pre-merger year and those banks whose data is available 
only at the merger year and a post-merger year are included in the sample here. 
In Figure 1, simple averages of bank characteristics for period   are depicted. 
Because we cannot compare accounting variables as of the year of M&As with 
the pre-merger or post-merger periods, we just connect a line for period -1 and 
period 1. For bank characteristics variables, we choose bank efficiency, market 
power, bank health, and portfolio variables. 
i
    First, we examine the bank efficiency variables: ROA, the cost ratio, and 
X-efficiency. The ROA of acquirers and targets are lower than peers before M&As, 
though the ROA of acquirers are higher than targets. The ROA did not increase 
after M&As as compared with the pre-merger acquirer or the pre-merger weighted 
average. The cost ratio of acquirers is lower than peers one and two years before 
M&As, while the cost ratio of targets is higher than peers before M&As. The cost 
ratio decreases one year after the merger compared with the pre-merger weighted 
average, but turns to increase afterwards. Judging from the ROA and the cost ratio, 
M&As do not seem to improve the profitability or cost efficiency. The X-efficiency of 
acquirers and targets are higher than peers before M&As. The X-efficiency once 
deteriorates just after M&As, and then recovers to the pre-period level three years 
after M&As. 
     Second, we analyze market power variables measured by the interest rate of 
deposits and the interest rate of loans. The interest rate of deposits of acquirers is 
higher than peers and that of targets is even higher before M&As, possibly 
reflecting a high risk of insolvency for acquirers and even so for targets. A high 
deposit interest rate continues after the M&As. The interest rates of loans of 
acquirers and targets are higher than peers before M&As, and that of consolidated 
banks is low after M&As. Merged banks do not seem to exert market power in loan 
markets, though we do not control for the changes in the deposit interest rate and 
operating costs. 
     Third,  we  investigate  bank  health  measured by total capital (i.e., membership 
accounts) as a proportion of assets (capital ratio), non-performing loans as a 
proportion of total loans (bad loan ratio), and gross increases in non-performing 
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ratio of acquirers is lower than peers and that of targets is even lower than that of 
the acquirers. The post-merger capital ratio does not increase from the pre-merger 
level of the weighted average. The pre-merger bad loan ratio of acquirers is higher 
than peers and that of targets is even higher than that of the acquirers. It decreases 
from the pre-merger level of the weighted average after M&A, but remains higher 
than peers at least for 5 years after M&As. The new bad loan ratio of acquirers is 
higher than peers and even so for targets before M&As. It initially decreases from 
the pre-merger weighted average but then increases from 3 years after M&As. 
M&As do not seem to improve bank health. 
          Finally, we look at the portfolio variables measured by loans as a proportion of 
total assets (loan ratio) and the growth rate of total loans (loan growth). Generally, a 
higher loan ratio implies a riskier portfolio, though we do not have data on the 
components of loans (e.g., housing loans, small business loans, etc). The loan ratios 
of acquirers and targets are higher than peers before M&As. The loan ratio of the 
consolidated bank tends to increase further two years and more after mergers. The 
loan growth of acquirers is slightly higher than peers but that of targets is much 
lower than peers before M&As. The loan growth rate of the consolidated banks 
remains at a low level relative to peers.   
 
5.  Empirical Results on the Motives for Consolidation 
 
     If bank managers’ value maximization motives drive consolidation, relatively 
profitable and efficient banks would tend to merge with relatively unprofitable and 
inefficient banks in order to spread superior expertise and management skills over 
the target bank. On the other hand, if the government’s motives of stabilizing the 
local banking system drive consolidation, relatively unhealthy banks tend to be 
merged with each other. 

















  3 , 2 , 1 = j for                      ( 1 )  
, where   is the probability of the bank’s choosing the variable  j p j , being an 
acquirer, a target, or neither. The dependent variable vector   consists of  j X
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variables including market concentration and macroeconomic variables. We 
choose the ROA and the cost ratio for the efficiency variables and the capital 
ratio for bank health measures. For the size variables, we use the logarithm of 
total assets (size) and the growth rate of total assets (size growth). As a degree 
of market concentration, we use the Herfindahl index. Finally, to control for 
macroeconomic shocks, we add the logarithm of prefectural GDP. All the 
explanatory variables are lagged by one-year.   
     Table 3A shows the estimation results. The first column shows the 
estimated coefficients and the second column shows estimated marginal effects. 
First two columns show the result for all the sample period. Banks are more 
likely to be a target if they display a lower ROA, a higher cost ratio, a lower 
capital ratio, a smaller size, a higher size growth, and operates in a prefecture 
whose GDP is higher and the Herfindahl index is higher. Banks are more likely 
to be an acquirer if they display a lower ROA, a higher cost ratio and a larger 
size. Less profitable and less cost efficient banks are more likely to be an 
acquirer and a target, though even less profitable and less cost efficient banks 
are more likely to be a target rather than an acquirer. In addition, a larger bank 
is more likely to be an acquirer and a smaller one a target. 
 To take into consideration the occurrence of the banking crisis and the 
change in regulatory frameworks in 1995, as is described in Section 2, we divide 
the sample periods into the sub-periods, 1991-95 and 1996-2002. The third to 
sixth columns show the estimation results for the 1991-95 and 1996-2002 
periods. In both sub-periods, banks with a lower capital ratio, a smaller size, 
and a smaller size growth are more likely to be a target. Banks with a larger 
size are more likely to be an acquirer for both periods. Though we found a 
negative correlation of ROA and a positive correlation of the cost ratio with the 
probability of being an acquirer in the 1996-2002 period, neither of these 
correlations is statistically significant, possibly due to a relatively smaller 
number of samples̒. 
If the primary motive of shinkin banks’ consolidation were value 
maximization, banks that are more profitable and cost efficient than peers 
would be more likely to acquire inefficient banks to spread their superior 
expertise and management skills over targets. However, even acquirers are less 
profitable and less cost efficient than peers. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that regulators promoted mergers among inefficient banks so that 
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aim of stabilizing the local banking system. The fact that a larger, but less 
profitable bank tends to become an acquirer suggests that the government tried 
to save such a bank through M&As. 
In Table 3B, we used the X-efficiency instead of the ROA and the cost ratio. 
While a bank with a higher X-efficiency is more likely to be a target, no such a 
significant correlation between X-efficiency and the probability of being an 
acquirer is found. 
 
5. Empirical Results on the Consequences of Consolidation 
 
A. Methodology 
          We investigate the consequences of M&As by comparing the bank 
characteristics variables of pre-merger and post-merger periods. From the 
viewpoint of existing shareholders (members) of acquirers, it is natural to 
compare pre-merger acquiring banks and post-merger consolidated banks. On 
the other hand, from the viewpoint of regulators and the banking system, it is 
useful to compare pre-merger weighted averages and post-merger consolidated 
banks. We compare both.   
Specifically, let    denote a bank characteristics variable 
A
i t X + X of an acquirer 
as of  , where period    is the year of M&A and  i t + t 1 , , , 4 , 5 − − − = i . Similarly, let 
denote the weighted average of 
W
i t X + X for an acquirer and a target with assets 
being weights and        the simple average of peers. Next, we take a difference of 
(or  ) and   for  each i   and denote the difference by  . Then we 
take a simple average over    to construct the average pre-merger relative value, 
 (or  ). For the post-merger value of 
P
i t X +
A
i t X +
W
i t X +
P
i t X +
A
i t X + ˆ
i
A
t pre X , ˆ W
t pre X , X , we take the difference of  X  
between the consolidated bank    and the peers   for 
A
i t X +
P
i t X + 5 , , , 2 , 1 = i , denoted by 
. Finally, we test whether the difference between the post merger value of   
A
i t X + ˆ A
i t X + ˆ
  11and the pre-merger average of   (or  ) is zero or not for each  . 
We also test whether the simple average of post-merger values of   over i , 
denoted by    is the same as    or not. In addition to the t-test for equal 
means, we also perform Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of    has median zero. 
A
t pre X , ˆ W
t pre X , 5 , , , 2 , 1 = i
A
i t X + ˆ
A
t post X , ˆ A




i t X X , ˆ ˆ − +
In this section, we select a sample where data on bank characteristics are 
available for the merger year, one or more pre-merger years, and one or more 
post-merger years to compare the post-merger performance with the 
pre-merger performance. This contrasts with data used to construct Figure 1, 
where we choose a sample where data were available for the merger year and 
one or more pre-merger years but not necessarily available for post-merger 
years and a sample where data were available for the merger year and one or 
more post-merger years but not necessarily available for pre-merger years.   
 
B. Baseline results 
     In this subsection, we choose as peers all the banks that are not involved 
with M&As throughout the sample period. Table 4 shows the differences of 
bank characteristics variables between pre-merger acquirers and post-merger 
consolidated banks. Looking at the comparison with the post-merger average 
values over up to 5 years, we see that the cost ratio, the capital ratio and the 
loan growth rate significantly decrease after M&As relative to peer banks. The 
other variables, including the ROA, the X-efficiency, the deposit interest rate, 
the loan interest rate, the bad loan and new bad loan ratios, and the loan ratio 
do not change significantly. Looking at the comparison with the post-merger 
periods for each year, we see that the ROA increases two years after M&A and 
the X-efficiency deteriorates one year after M&A (though both are significant 
only for the z-statistics). 
     Table 5 shows the differences of bank characteristics variables between 
pre-merger weighted averages and post-merger consolidated banks. Looking at 
the comparison with the average of post-merger periods up to 5 years, we see 
that the cost ratio and the capital ratio rate significantly decrease after M&As, 
while the other variables do not change significantly. In Appendix 3, we 
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non-personnel expenditure, and taxes, and find that the personnel expenditure 
significantly decreased after M&As, suggesting that M&As promoted a 
reduction in personnel costs. Looking at the comparison with the post-merger 
periods for each year, we see that the ROA increases one and two years after 
M&As (significantly only for the z-statistics), the X-efficiency deteriorates one 
year after M&As and the loan ratio also increases three to five years after 
M&As (significantly either for the t-statistics or z-statistics). 
     In sum, there is some evidence that the cost efficiency of M&As improved 
both for pre-merger acquirers and weighted average of participating banks. The 
profitability also tended to improve, though the period of improvement was 
limited to within two years after the merger. These results are consistent with 
the value-maximization hypothesis, though we do not control for the changes in 
bank risk or portfolio. Once we control for these factors by estimating the 
X-efficiency, we do not find evidence that the operating efficiency improved 
after M&As. On the other hand, the bank health conditions deteriorated by 
M&As from pre-merger acquirers or weighted averages. It may be surprising 
that the increase in ROA did not lead to a higher capital ratio. However, as 
Figure 1 suggests, the ROA of consolidated banks remained lower than peers 
after M&As, which continued to deteriorate the capital ratio. The improvement 
of ROA after the merger was not sufficient to offset the initial gap of the capital 
ratio between merging banks (i.e., acquirers and targets) and peers. Appendix 4 
shows the differences of major components of the capital ratio between 
pre-merger weighted averages and post-merger consolidated banks, suggesting 
that the decrease in capital (i.e., membership accounts), in particular the 
decrease in special reserves, account for most parts of the decrease in the 
capital ratio. From the viewpoint of borrowers, it is notable that the loan 
interest rate and the loan growth rate of consolidated banks did not increase as 
compared with pre-merger weighted averages. 
     Tables 6 and 7 show the differences of bank characteristics variables 
between pre-merger weighted averages and post-merger consolidated banks for 
the two sub-periods: 1991-1995 and 1996-2002. We see that the improvement in 
the cost ratio and ROA is evident in the latter half of the 1990s (i.e., 1996-2002) 
but not in the first half of the 1990s (i.e., 1991-95). We also find some evidence 
that X-efficiency improved in the latter half of the 1990s (significantly three 
years after M&A), and that it deteriorated in the first half of the 1990s. In 
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1990s. The improvement in profitability seems to have been brought about both 
by more efficient operation and stronger market power after M&As in the latter 
half of the 1990s. On the other hand, the deterioration in the capital ratio is 
clear throughout the 1990s (i.e., both in the 1991-95 and 1996-2002 periods). 
    The effects of M&As on bank profitability and cost efficiency were more 
pronounced in the latter half of the 1990s than in the first half of the 1990s. 
Shinkin banks may have been forced to restructure their business and to 
improve profitability as the banking system became more unstable due to the 
non-performing loan problems in the latter half of the 1990s than before. The 
regulatory authorities may also have urged unhealthy banks to restore 
healthiness to stabilize the local banking system. In addition, as the loan 
market became concentrated due to the consolidations that had occurred in the 
first half of the 1990s, shinkin banks may have been easier to raise the loan 
interest rate in the latter half of the 1990s. 
 
B. Robustness check 
          In the baseline estimation results above, we use as peers those banks that 
did not merge or were not merged with other banks throughout the period, 
which may result in some bias. As has been made clear from the previous 
section, less profitable and less cost efficient banks are more likely to be an 
acquirer and a target. If a low ROA and a high cost ratio come from a temporary 
shock and they tend to return to a normal level in the near future, i.e., if the 
ROA and the cost ratio are mean reverting, we may find that M&As tend to 
improve the profitability and cost efficiency relative to the peer banks that were 
not hit by an unfavorable temporary shock, even though M&A activities do not 
have any impacts on consolidated banks. To avoid this potential bias, we choose 
as peers those banks that were likely to be an acquirer or a target but were not 
actually involved with mergers. We may consider that those banks were likely 
to be hit by a similar unfavorable shock but did not happen to merge. The 
probability of being an acquirer or a target is derived from the estimation result 
in Table 3 for the full sample period. We have 2976 observations constructing 
newly weighted averaged peers, and we have 5118 observations for 
constructing previously weighted averaged peers. See the details for 
constructing new peers in Appendix 5, which also reports the accuracy of the 
estimated probability of being an acquirer or a target. Though our estimates 
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banks that are classified as “ambiguous” banks are about 49%, the proportion of 
actual peers is 97%), the relative probability of being an acquirer or a target 
seems to be reasonably accurate (Among the banks that are classified as 
“definitely target” banks, those banks that are actually targets and acquirers 
are 57 and 5, respectively. Similarly, among the banks that are classified as 
“definitely acquirer” banks, those banks that are actually acquirers and targets 
are 75 and 11, respectively).     
        Table 8 shows the results for the weighted average of acquirers and targets. 
ROA significantly improves one to two years after M&As, as in the baseline 
results. The improvement of the cost ratio, however, is not significant. The 
X-efficiency significantly deteriorates one year after M&As. The capital ratio 
significantly deteriorates, again as in the baseline results. The loan ratio tends 
to increase, unlike the baseline results, suggesting that the consolidated bank 
portfolio became riskier.   
     In sum, the effects of consolidation on the profitability and bank health 
are robust, while the result for the effect on the cost efficiency is somewhat 
weaker than the baseline result. 
   
6.  Ex ante conditions and the gains from consolidation 
 
A.  Hypotheses 
     The previous sections show that, on average, the cost efficiency and 
profitability improved but bank health deteriorated for banks engaged in M&As. 
However, the consequences of bank consolidation may depend on various ex 
ante characteristics of acquirers and targets as well as market conditions. 
 
The relative performance hypothesis 
     If a relatively efficient bank acquires a relatively inefficient bank and 
applies its superior managerial skills to the consolidated bank, then the 
efficiency gains could be greater. Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) call 
this the relative efficiency hypothesis. Using data on U.S. megamergers, they 
found evidence supporting the relative efficiency hypothesis. 
     We test whether differences in the ROA and the capital ratios between 
pre-merger acquirers and targets, denoted by relative performance and relative 
healthiness, respectively, have an impact on the changes in the post-merger 
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variables are weighted by the proportion of their combined pre-merger total 
assets accounted for by the target. 
 
The low efficiency hypothesis 
          Profit efficiency may tend to improve if either the acquirer or the target or 
both are poor performers. Akhavein et al., (1997) points out that the merger 
may “wake up” management and be used as an “excuse” to implement 
restructuring that would be difficult to implement without the merger. If either 
or both of merging banks are inefficient prior to the merger, there is large room 
for improvement Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) obtain evidences 
from the U.S. mergers consistent with this hypothesis. 
 We test whether the ROA and the capital ratio of the acquirer and target 
have an impact on changes in the post-merger performances. 
 
The relative size hypotheses 
    The size of the target relative to the size of the acquirer may have an 
impact on the performance of the merger. Akhavein et al., (1997) asserts that in 
the case of “mergers of equals,” there may be greater cost savings from the 
elimination of parallel management structures, though their evidence does not 
support this hypothesis. 
   Milgrom and Roberts (1992), on the other hand, insist that the costs of 
mergers, including conflicts of corporate cultures and political battles leading to 
influence costs, tend to arise when similar-sized organizations are brought 
together.  
To test these conflicting hypotheses, we test whether the size of the target 
relative to the size of the acquirer has an impact on changes in the post-merger 
performances. 
 
B. Baseline results 
        We estimate the following equation using all the pre-merger and 
post-merger bank data. 
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  16, where the dependent variable  Y ∆ is the difference of bank characteristics 
variables between the weighted average of acquirers and targets averaged over 
up to 5 years before M&As and the consolidated banks averaged over up to 5 
years after M&As. The dependent variables are all the pre-merger time average 
values over up to 5 years. We take differences of all the variables from peers to 
control fro macroeconomic shocks. We add the pre-merger sum of acquirers and 
targets: the market share of deposits, and the logarithm of total assets. 
Furthermore, we add two prefectural indexes: the Herfindahl Index of deposit 
market within a prefecture and the growth rate of prefecture GDP̓. When we 
test the low efficiency hypothesis instead of the relative efficiency hypothesis, 
we replace the relative performance with the acquirer’s and the target’s 
pre-merger performance variables and the relative health with the acquirer’s 
and the target’s pre-merger health variables. In this subsection, we use as peers 
all the banks that are not involved with mergers. 
     Table 9 shows the estimation results for the full sample period. The 
relative performance and the relative healthiness have a significantly positive 
impact on the change in ROA (Panel A) and the change in the capital ratio 
(Panel F) and a significantly negative impact on the change in the bad loan 
ratio (Panel G). In Panel C, we measure the relative efficiency by the difference 
in X-efficiency between acquirers and targets and found that it also has a 
significantly positive impact on the change in the X-efficiency. These results are 
consistent with the relative performance hypothesis. In addition, the relative 
performance and the relative healthiness have a significantly positive impact 
on the loan growth rate. 
Dividing the relative performance into the acquirer’s and the target’s 
performance and the relative healthiness into the acquirer’s and the target’s 
healthiness, we see that better pre-merger performance and healthiness tend to 
improve the cost efficiency and healthiness, while the target’s worse pre-merger 
performance and healthiness tend to improve the cost efficiency and 
healthiness. These results support the relative performance hypothesis. The 
results for the target’s pre-merger performance and healthiness are also 
consistent with the low efficiency hypothesis. Poorer pre-merger target 
performance and healthiness result in a higher loan growth rate, suggesting 
that the loan growth rate tends to recover from a low level at the target. 
The relative size has a significantly negative impact on the capital ratio 
(Panel F), suggesting that consolidating banks tend to increase the capital ratio 
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consistent with the conflict of corporate culture hypothesis (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
Bank size has a significantly negative impact on the deposit interest rate 
(Panel D), suggesting that depositors feel safer if larger banks merge. 
     Dividing the sample period into the two sub-periods, 1991-1995 and 
1996-2002, we see that the full sample estimation results largely resemble the 
results for the latter half of the 1990s, though the results are not shown to save 
space. (The results are available from the authors upon request.) 
 
C. Robustness check 
     To avoid the sample selection bias mentioned in the previous section, we 
use peers defined in Section 5. B. The results (Table 10) are virtually the same 
as the baseline results. Especially, the relative performance and the relative 
healthiness have a significantly positive impact on the change in ROA and the 
capital ratio and a significantly negative impact on the change in the bad loan 
ratio. The relative efficiency and the acquirer’s X-efficiency have a positive 
impact on the change in the X-efficiency.   
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The recent waves of mergers and acquisitions in the banking industries across 
the world raise important questions of whether mergers enhance the efficiency of 
surviving banks and contribute to the stabilization of the banking sector. We 
investigate the motives and consequences of the consolidation of cooperative banks 
(Shinkin) in Japan during the period 1984-2002. Our major findings are as follows. 
First, less profitable and less cost efficient banks are more likely to be an 
acquirer and a target, though even less profitable and less cost efficient banks are 
more likely to be a target rather than an acquirer. In addition, a larger bank is more 
likely to be an acquirer and smaller one a target. These results are consistent with 
the regulators’ motive for stabilizing the local banking system. Large, but unhealthy 
and inefficient banks respond to the regulators request, implicit or explicit, to 
merge a small and inefficient banks in order to survive and benefit from a 
subsidized deposit rate. 
Second, acquiring banks improved cost efficiency after consolidation. M&As 
also raised the loan interest rate and improved profitability particularly in the 
  18latter half of the 1990s. While M&As deteriorated X-efficiency in the first half of the 
1990s, they improved X-efficiency in the last half of the 1990s. The improvement in 
profitability seems to have been brought about both by more efficient operation and 
stronger market power since the latter half of the 1990s. The latter result may be 
problematic from the viewpoint of competition policy. Nonetheless, the improvement 
of ROA after the merger was not sufficient to offset the initial gap of the capital 
ratio between merging banks (i.e., acquirers and targets) and peers, resulting in the 
deterioration of the capital ratio of consolidated banks relative to peers. M&As did 
not appear to contribute sufficiently to stabilizing the local banking system. 
Finally, consolidation tended to improve the profitability of merging banks 
when the difference in profitability and healthiness between acquiring banks and 
target banks were large, which is consistent with the relative efficiency hypothesis 




                                                  
̍ The main data source of this subsection is Zenkoku Shinyo Kinko Kyokai (2002). 
̎ The data source for asset size is the Nikkei Financial Quest.  
̏ We reestimate X-efficiency in a way that incorporates loan quality measured by 
loan losses and bank capital (Mester, ****), and obtained a similar result for the 
determinants of the probability of being a target or an acquirer (Table 3B).   
̐ The differences in the interest rates on deposits and loans, in particular, seem to 
reflect the fact that a large number of M&As occurred in the latter half of the 1990s, 
when Bank of Japan implemented an extremely-low-interest-rate policy. 
̑ If three and more shinkin banks merged, the series of target are a weighted sum 
of the targets and the series of the weighted average are a weighted sum of the 
targets and acquirers. In both series, we use total assets as weights. 
̒ Using the 1991-2002 sample period, we found a positive correlation between the 
probability of being an acquirer and the cost ratio that is statistically significant, 
while we also found a negative correlation between the probability of being an 
acquirer and ROA is statistically insignificant.   
̓ One may concern about a high correlation between the market share and the 
Herfindahl Index. We dropped either of these two variables and obtained the same 
sign and a similar statistical significance of the coefficient on the remaining 
variable. We also checked the robustness of our results by redefining the market 
share and the Herfindahl Index including the deposits of the regional banks that 
operate in the same prefecture. We again obtained a similar result. 
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2001 349 11 6 0 0
2002 326 15 6 0 0
Total 7,961 87 22 1 3
Table 2. Summary Statistics
All Peer Target Acquirer
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
ROA (%) 0.41 0.45 -1.78 0.24
(0.90) (0.50) (5.97) (0.50)
Cost ratio (%) 39.94 39.65 52.31 47.10
(14.24) (14.09) (16.83) (14.38)
X-efficiency 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.45
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Interest rate of deposit (% 2.27 2.30 1.20 1.34
(1.56) (1.55) (1.47) (1.39)
Interest rate of loan (%) 5.24 5.27 4.00 4.16
(1.72) (1.72) (1.56) (1.48)
Capital ratio (%) 5.28 5.33 1.89 5.03
(9.55) (9.64) (7.91) (1.70)
Bad loan ratio (%) 6.00 5.78 12.13 7.72
(4.42) (4.15) (7.45) (5.23)
New bad loan ratio (%) 0.20 0.19 0.42 0.26
(0.40) (0.36) (1.01) (0.35)
Loan ratio (%) 58.14 58.08 60.06 60.07
(9.59) (9.53) (14.11) (7.86)
Loan growth (%) 4.30 4.43 -3.36 3.43
(8.67) (8.64) (6.11) (9.63)
ln(Asset) 18.68 18.68 18.26 19.27
(1.00) (0.99) (0.96) (0.98)
Asset growth (%) 3.20 3.28 -3.54 4.81
(25.16) (25.45) (11.54) (11.53)
Market share (%) 11.27 11.32 5.23 13.67
(12.10) (12.11) (6.22) (13.85)
Herfindahl index 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
ln(Prefectual GDP) 16.20 16.19 16.63 16.48
(1.04) (1.04) (1.11) (1.07)
Number of observations  7,961 7,723 119 119Table 3A. Multinominal logistic regression
All 1991-1995 1996-2002
Coef. Merg. Eff Coef. Merg. Eff Coef. Merg. Eff
Target
ROA -0.678 a -0.005 a -0.247 -0.002 -0.119 -0.001
(0.100) (0.001) (0.158) (0.001) (0.144) (0.001)
Cost ratio 0.033 a 0.000 a -0.039 0.000 0.009 0.000
(0.007) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000)
Capital ratio -0.009 a 0.000 b -0.377 a -0.003 a -0.442 a -0.003 a
(0.004) (0.000) (0.136) (0.001) (0.092) (0.001)
Size -0.713 a -0.005 a -0.914 a -0.006 a -1.034 a -0.008 a
(0.108) (0.001) (0.249) (0.002) (0.168) (0.002)
Size growth -0.011 c 0.000 c -0.090 b -0.001 c -0.149 a -0.001 a
(0.006) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000)
Prefectural GDP 0.729 a 0.005 a 0.288 0.002 0.696 a 0.005 a
(0.131) (0.001) (0.278) (0.002) (0.192) (0.002)
Herfindahl index 3.168 a 0.023 a 0.621 0.004 1.965 0.015
(1.010) (0.007) (2.500) (0.017) (1.329) (0.011)
Cons -4.870 c 11.133 b 5.306
(2.656) (5.651) (4.044)
Acquirer
ROA -0.308 b -0.004 c 0.151 0.002 -0.281 -0.006
(0.154) (0.002) (0.816) (0.009) (0.194) (0.005)
Cost ratio 0.025 a 0.000 a 0.018 0.000 0.005 0.000
(0.007) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000)
Capital ratio -0.006 0.000 -0.273 -0.003 -0.022 0.000
(0.011) (0.000) (0.174) (0.002) (0.068) (0.002)
Size 0.545 a 0.006 a 0.383 0.004 c 0.601 a 0.014 a
(0.112) (0.001) (0.234) (0.002) (0.162) (0.003)
Size growth 0.001 0.000 -0.019 0.000 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Prefectural GDP -0.002 0.000 -0.373 -0.004 0.046 0.001
(0.144) (0.002) (0.320) (0.003) (0.202) (0.005)
Herfindahl index 0.047 0.000 -2.092 -0.023 0.451 0.010
(1.140) (0.013) (2.803) (0.031) (1.356) (0.031)
Cons -15.411 a -4.363 -16.128 a
(2.297) (5.157) (3.774)
Obs 7761 2127 2599
Pseudo R-sq 0.129 0.070 0.198
Log likelihood -1025.9 -268.8 -532.2
Notes: 
(1) The base outcome is "neither of acquirer or target".
(2) Standard errors are in parentheses. 




X-efficiency 4.448 a 6.611 b 4.520 b
(1.649) (3.148) (1.889)
Capital ratio -0.003 -0.398 a -0.530 a
(0.002) (0.136) (0.091)
Size -0.630 a -0.826 a -1.114 a
(0.097) (0.245) (0.165)
Size growth -0.015 a -0.065 -0.147 a
(0.004) (0.041) (0.034)
Prefectural GDP 1.009 a 0.260 0.762 a
(0.125) (0.272) (0.193)
Herfindahl index 5.164 a 0.701 1.866
(0.908) (2.542) (1.327)
Cons -11.957 a 5.696 4.610
(2.627) (6.365) (3.976)
Acquirer
X-efficiency 0.578 -2.936 0.476
(1.961) (6.289) (1.958)
Capital ratio -0.003 -0.247 -0.064
(0.008) (0.152) (0.068)
Size 0.535 a 0.346 0.572 a
(0.109) (0.229) (0.156)
Size growth 0.000 -0.023 0.003
(0.003) (0.039) (0.009)
Prefectural GDP 0.109 -0.349 0.034
(0.144) (0.316) (0.205)
Herfindahl index 0.956 -2.006 0.393
(1.118) (2.776) (1.370)
Cons -16.486 a -2.257 -15.059 a
(2.411) (5.936) (3.456)
Obs 7761 2126 2599
Pseudo R-sq 0.060 0.072 0.202
Log likelihood -1107.5 -268.3 -529.1
Notes: 
(1) The base outcome is "neither of acquirer or target".
(2) Standard errors are in parentheses. 










Table 4. Changes in Bank Characteristics after M&As: Acquirers
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 Average
ROA
Pre-merger -0.09 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09
Post-merger (t years after -0.10 -0.29 -0.16 -0.21 -0.29 -0.21
Diff -0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.13 -0.20 -0.12
t-Statistics -0.15 -0.60 -0.69 -1.14 -0.80 -1.03
z-Statistics 0.64 2.09 b 0.07 -0.43 0.55 0.47
Cost ratio
Pre-merger -0.27 0.13 0.48 0.66 0.75 -0.27
Post-merger (t years after -1.74 -0.67 -1.07 -0.15 -0.59 -1.89
Diff -1.47 -0.81 -1.55 -0.81 -1.35 -1.61
t-Statistics -2.17 b -0.98 -1.70 c -0.97 -1.13 -2.29 b
z-Statistics -1.52 -1.20 -2.05 b -0.65 -0.75 -2.18 b
X-efficiency
Pre-merger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Post-merger (t years after -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Diff -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
t-Statistics -1.43 -0.33 0.79 0.21 0.44 -0.58
z-Statistics -1.77 c -0.64 0.14 -0.26 -0.48 -0.97
Interest rates of deposits
Pre-merger 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
Post-merger (t years after 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Diff 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02
t-Statistics 1.51 1.30 1.53 1.48 1.28 1.22
z-Statistics 1.27 1.06 1.51 1.37 1.08 1.05
Interest rates of loans
Pre-merger -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
Post-merger (t years after 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
Diff 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
t-Statistics 0.73 0.00 0.55 0.24 0.07 0.84
z-Statistics 0.94 -0.03 0.73 0.19 0.40 0.74
Capital ratio
Pre-merger -0.71 -0.70 -0.49 -0.44 -0.40 -0.71
Post-merger (t years after -1.38 -1.60 -1.46 -1.44 -1.70 -1.60
Diff -0.68 -0.90 -0.97 -1.00 -1.30 -0.89
t-Statistics -5.68 a -2.87 a -4.65 a -3.84 a -3.32 a -5.13 a
z-Statistics -4.86 a -3.93 a -3.92 a -3.22 a -3.10 a -5.01 a
Bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 0.76 0.81 0.33 -0.03 -0.03 0.76
Post-merger (t years after 1.70 1.49 1.43 1.50 0.97 1.32
Diff 0.94 0.67 1.11 1.53 0.99 0.56
t-Statistics 1.48 0.83 1.31 2.66 1.42 0.97
z-Statistics 1.27 0.78 1.27 1.60 1.07 0.85
New bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 0.30 -0.50 0.67 0.30
Post-merger (t years after -0.12 -0.64 -1.03 -0.48
Diff -0.42 -0.14 -1.70 -0.78
t-Statistics -0.47 -0.12 -0.98 -0.93
z-Statistics -0.52 -0.71 -1.07 -0.98
Loan ratio
Pre-merger 3.79 3.89 4.00 3.18 2.75 3.79
Post-merger (t years after 3.32 3.81 4.17 3.31 3.45 3.71
Diff -0.47 -0.08 0.17 0.13 0.70 -0.08
t-Statistics -1.01 -0.15 0.26 0.17 0.74 -0.18
z-Statistics -1.05 -0.53 0.08 0.28 0.73 -0.19
Loan growth
Pre-merger 0.23 0.53 -0.14 0.21 0.23 0.23
Post-merger (t years after -0.84 -0.62 -1.94 -1.84 -0.24 -0.73
Diff -1.08 -1.15 -1.80 -2.06 -0.47 -0.96
t-Statistics -1.38 -1.55 -3.22 a -2.71 b -0.27 -1.46
z-Statistics -1.33 -1.27 -2.89 a -2.64 a -1.86 c -1.66 c
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent differences from the average of peers.










Table 5. Changes in Bank Characteristics after M&As: Weighted Average
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 Average
ROA
Pre-merger -0.23 -0.26 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.23
Post-merger (t years after -0.10 -0.29 -0.16 -0.21 -0.29 -0.22
Diff 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.16 0.02
t-Statistics 1.60 -0.12 -0.21 -0.80 -0.64 0.12
z-Statistics 1.97 b 2.47 b 0.29 0.04 1.04 1.58
Cost ratio
Pre-merger 0.09 0.41 0.68 0.58 0.66 0.09
Post-merger (t years after -1.53 -0.39 -1.07 -0.15 -0.59 -1.69
Diff -1.62 -0.80 -1.75 -0.74 -1.25 -1.78
t-Statistics -2.16 b -0.87 -1.71 c -0.88 -1.02 -2.30 b
z-Statistics -1.28 -0.73 -1.63 -0.47 -0.63 -1.91 c
X-efficiency
Pre-merger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Post-merger (t years after -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Diff -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
t-Statistics -1.71 c -0.47 0.56 -0.13 0.15 -0.83
z-Statistics -1.80 c -0.55 0.11 -0.54 -0.75 -1.13
Interest rates of deposits
Pre-merger 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Post-merger (t years after 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Diff 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
t-Statistics 1.27 0.98 1.16 1.00 0.79 0.96
z-Statistics 0.57 0.59 1.16 1.03 0.55 0.70
Interest rates of loans
Pre-merger -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02
Post-merger (t years after 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02
Diff 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
t-Statistics 1.13 0.81 1.06 0.83 0.72 1.32
z-Statistics 1.28 0.64 1.23 0.47 0.67 1.20
Capital ratio
Pre-merger -0.98 -0.92 -0.63 -0.55 -0.52 -0.98
Post-merger (t years after -1.37 -1.59 -1.46 -1.44 -1.70 -1.59
Diff -0.39 -0.68 -0.83 -0.89 -1.18 -0.61
t-Statistics -2.83 a -1.97 c -4.19 a -3.58 a -3.12 a -3.04 a
z-Statistics -3.28 a -2.75 a -3.41 a -2.84 a -2.66 a -3.29 a
Bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 1.89 2.02 0.82 0.47 0.47 1.89
Post-merger (t years after 1.59 1.35 0.95 1.50 0.97 1.23
Diff -0.30 -0.67 0.13 1.03 0.50 -0.65
t-Statistics -0.42 -0.63 0.17 1.75 0.49 -0.98
z-Statistics -0.18 -0.20 0.28 1.60 0.59 -0.76
New bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 0.77 -0.66 0.12 0.77
Post-merger (t years after -0.11 -0.73 -0.38 -0.51
Diff -0.88 -0.07 -0.49 -1.27
t-Statistics -0.74 -0.05 -0.49 -1.17
z-Statistics -0.77 -0.51 -0.45 -1.25
Loan ratio
Pre-merger 3.15 2.97 2.97 2.07 1.58 3.15
Post-merger (t years after 3.20 3.65 4.17 3.31 3.45 3.59
Diff 0.05 0.67 1.20 1.24 1.87 0.44
t-Statistics 0.11 1.12 1.83 c 1.69 1.90 c 0.84
z-Statistics -0.03 0.63 1.49 1.72 c 1.68 c 0.70
Loan growth
Pre-merger -0.96 -0.86 -1.06 -0.71 -0.74 -0.96
Post-merger (t years after -0.86 -0.69 -1.94 -1.84 -0.24 -0.76
Diff 0.10 0.17 -0.87 -1.14 0.50 0.20
t-Statistics 0.15 0.26 -1.56 -1.49 0.27 0.35
z-Statistics 0.09 0.36 -1.40 -1.61 -0.98 0.14
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent differences from the average of peers.








Table 6. Changes in Bank Characteristics after M&As: Weighted Average, 1991-1995
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 Average
ROA
Pre-merger -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10
Post-merger (t years after -0.15 -0.14 -0.06 -0.19 -0.39 -0.19
Diff -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.28 -0.09
t-Statistics -1.10 -0.58 0.46 -0.57 -0.78 -0.70
z-Statistics -1.22 -0.67 -0.05 0.24 0.50 -0.18
Cost ratio
Pre-merger 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.83 0.93
Post-merger (t years after 0.83 0.72 1.32 0.91 0.65 0.88
Diff -0.10 -0.21 0.40 -0.01 -0.18 -0.05
t-Statistics -0.09 -0.16 0.33 -0.01 -0.13 -0.04
z-Statistics 1.22 0.37 0.18 0.44 0.23 0.41
X-efficiency
Pre-merger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Post-merger (t years after -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
Diff -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
t-Statistics -4.24 a -2.43 b -2.34 b -1.70 -1.81 c -2.57 b
z-Statistics -3.20 a -2.16 b -2.00 b -1.61 -1.69 c -2.32 b
Interest rates of deposits
Pre-merger -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Post-merger (t years after -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Diff 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
t-Statistics -0.02 0.11 0.18 0.30 -0.08 0.22
z-Statistics -0.37 -0.18 0.05 0.18 -0.02 0.08
Interest rates of loans
Pre-merger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Post-merger (t years after -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
Diff -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
t-Statistics -0.33 -0.58 -0.31 -0.11 0.14 -0.25
z-Statistics -0.21 -0.63 -0.11 -0.44 0.19 -0.31
Capital ratio
Pre-merger -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.39 -0.40
Post-merger (t years after -0.76 -0.88 -1.23 -1.31 -1.71 -1.17
Diff -0.36 -0.48 -0.83 -0.91 -1.32 -0.77
t-Statistics -2.56 b -2.56 b -2.76 b -2.92 a -2.55 b -3.21 a
z-Statistics -2.13 b -2.16 b -2.06 b -2.13 b -1.89 c -2.45 b
Bad loan ratio
Pre-merger




New bad loan ratio
Pre-merger





Pre-merger 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.48 0.83
Post-merger (t years after 1.53 1.85 2.09 1.44 1.68 1.76
Diff 0.70 1.02 1.26 0.61 1.19 0.93
t-Statistics 0.81 1.19 1.39 0.70 1.04 1.12
z-Statistics 0.80 0.96 1.06 0.63 0.85 0.86
Loan growth
Pre-merger -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.58 -0.46
Post-merger (t years after -0.07 -0.59 -2.46 -1.70 -2.15 -1.39
Diff 0.39 -0.13 -2.00 -1.24 -1.57 -0.93
t-Statistics 0.34 -0.13 -2.51 b -1.34 -1.73 c -1.28
z-Statistics 0.11 -0.34 -2.32 b -1.22 -1.55 -1.02
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent differences from the average of peers.










Table 7. Changes in Bank Characteristics after M&As: Weighted Average, 1996-2002
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 Average
ROA
Pre-merger -0.32 -0.41 -0.21 -0.16 -0.19 -0.32
Post-merger (t years after -0.07 -0.45 -0.33 -0.31 -0.02 -0.24
Diff 0.25 -0.04 -0.12 -0.15 0.17 0.07
t-Statistics 1.90 c -0.07 -0.53 -0.72 1.57 0.35
z-Statistics 2.71 a 3.24 a -0.09 -0.51 1.15 1.76 c
Cost ratio
Pre-merger -0.44 -0.08 0.26 -0.61 -0.01 -0.44
Post-merger (t years after -2.90 -1.32 -5.18 -4.16 -5.75 -3.29
Diff -2.46 -1.25 -5.44 -3.56 -5.74 -2.85
t-Statistics -2.33 b -0.86 -3.04 a -2.41 c -1.65 -2.60 b
z-Statistics -1.94 c -0.90 -2.61 a -2.03 b -1.36 -2.32 b
X-efficiency
Pre-merger 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Post-merger (t years after 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.00
Diff -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.00
t-Statistics -0.60 0.52 2.07 c 1.44 1.66 0.09
z-Statistics -0.64 0.78 1.73 c 1.52 1.57 -0.04
Interest rates of deposits
Pre-merger 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Post-merger (t years after 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.03
Diff 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.01
t-Statistics 1.45 1.21 2.36 b 2.95 b 0.92 0.91
z-Statistics 1.10 0.93 2.17 b 1.86 c 0.73 0.73
Interest rates of loans
Pre-merger -0.03 -0.06 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13 -0.03
Post-merger (t years after 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.06
Diff 0.07 0.12 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.08
t-Statistics 1.90 c 2.23 b 3.10 a 1.96 c 1.15 2.30 b
z-Statistics 1.86 c 2.30 b 2.92 a 2.03 b 0.94 2.40 b
Capital ratio
Pre-merger -1.38 -1.49 -1.14 -1.29 -1.27 -1.38
Post-merger (t years after -1.78 -2.36 -2.07 -2.28 -2.27 -1.91
Diff -0.39 -0.87 -0.92 -0.99 -1.00 -0.52
t-Statistics -1.85 c -1.29 -3.22 a -1.69 -1.73 -1.75 c
z-Statistics -2.18 b -1.57 -2.61 a -1.86 c -1.78 c -2.05 b
Bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 1.89 2.02 0.82 0.47 0.47 1.89
Post-merger (t years after 1.59 1.35 0.95 1.50 0.97 1.23
Diff -0.30 -0.67 0.13 1.03 0.50 -0.65
t-Statistics -0.42 -0.63 0.17 1.75 0.49 -0.98
z-Statistics -0.18 -0.20 0.28 1.60 0.54 -0.76
New bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 0.77 -0.66 0.12 0.77
Post-merger (t years after -0.11 -0.73 -0.38 -0.51
Diff -0.88 -0.07 -0.49 -1.27
t-Statistics -0.74 -0.05 -0.49 -1.17
z-Statistics -0.77 -0.51 -0.45 -1.25
Loan ratio
Pre-merger 4.40 4.75 6.15 5.18 4.28 4.40
Post-merger (t years after 4.18 5.34 7.44 9.27 10.17 4.66
Diff -0.22 0.58 1.29 4.10 5.89 0.26
t-Statistics -0.32 0.62 1.10 2.94 b 3.00 b 0.36
z-Statistics -0.47 0.28 0.97 2.03 b 1.99 b 0.35
Loan growth
Pre-merger -1.44 -1.49 -2.60 -2.52 -2.53 -1.44
Post-merger (t years after -1.04 -0.47 -1.41 -2.02 6.84 -0.28
Diff 0.41 1.02 1.18 0.50 9.36 1.16
t-Statistics 0.49 1.15 1.79 c 0.31 1.15 1.49
z-Statistics 0.22 1.38 1.54 0.00 1.15 1.47
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent differences from the average of peers.










Table 8. Changes in Bank Characteristics after M&As: Weighted Average, Robustness Check
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 Average
ROA
Pre-merger -0.24 -0.27 -0.15 -0.13 -0.14 -0.24
Post-merger (t years after -0.15 -0.32 -0.18 -0.24 -0.33 -0.27
Diff 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02
t-Statistics 1.25 -0.20 -0.34 -0.92 -0.76 -0.17
z-Statistics 1.69 c 2.37 b 0.28 -0.22 0.73 1.10
Cost ratio
Pre-merger 0.93 1.10 1.28 1.17 1.25 0.93
Post-merger (t years after 0.03 1.05 0.30 1.26 1.11 0.16
Diff -0.90 -0.05 -0.99 0.09 -0.13 -0.77
t-Statistics -1.23 -0.05 -1.02 0.11 -0.11 -1.02
z-Statistics -0.35 0.23 -0.91 0.69 0.22 -0.29
X-efficiency
Pre-merger 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Post-merger (t years after -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Diff -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
t-Statistics -1.75 c -0.54 0.52 -0.13 0.10 -0.92
z-Statistics -1.77 c -0.72 0.03 -0.56 -0.71 -1.19
Interest rates of deposits
Pre-merger 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Post-merger (t years after 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Diff 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
t-Statistics 1.13 0.69 0.69 0.56 0.40 0.67
z-Statistics 0.42 0.38 0.75 0.75 0.24 0.53
Interest rates of loans
Pre-merger 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06
Post-merger (t years after 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10
Diff 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
t-Statistics 1.26 0.86 1.01 0.80 0.64 1.35
z-Statistics 1.31 0.56 1.10 0.37 0.55 1.12
Capital ratio
Pre-merger -1.00 -0.95 -0.68 -0.61 -0.59 -1.00
Post-merger (t years after -1.46 -1.65 -1.49 -1.46 -1.76 -1.69
Diff -0.45 -0.70 -0.81 -0.85 -1.17 -0.69
t-Statistics -3.44 a -2.05 b -4.04 a -3.38 a -3.10 a -3.54 a
z-Statistics -3.76 a -2.90 a -3.27 a -2.54 b -2.52 b -3.85 a
Bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 2.00 2.13 0.98 0.64 0.64 2.00
Post-merger (t years after 1.86 1.59 1.19 1.84 1.32 1.53
Diff -0.14 -0.54 0.21 1.20 0.68 -0.47
t-Statistics -0.19 -0.51 0.28 2.04 0.68 -0.71
z-Statistics 0.06 -0.20 0.28 1.60 1.07 -0.45
New bad loan ratio
Pre-merger 0.74 -0.67 0.10 0.74
Post-merger (t years after 0.02 -0.53 -0.32 -0.38
Diff -0.71 0.13 -0.43 -1.11
t-Statistics -0.61 0.08 -0.43 -1.02
z-Statistics -0.64 -0.34 -0.45 -1.17
Loan ratio
Pre-merger 2.34 2.01 1.85 0.78 0.29 2.34
Post-merger (t years after 3.05 3.46 3.94 3.09 3.26 3.57
Diff 0.71 1.45 2.10 2.31 2.97 1.23
t-Statistics 1.37 2.37 b 3.19 a 3.17 a 2.98 a 2.33 b
z-Statistics 1.29 1.79 c 2.47 b 2.66 a 2.54 b 2.17 b
Loan growth
Pre-merger -0.92 -0.89 -1.17 -0.89 -0.93 -0.92
Post-merger (t years after -0.70 -0.50 -1.70 -1.67 -0.04 -0.59
Diff 0.22 0.39 -0.54 -0.78 0.88 0.33
t-Statistics 0.32 0.61 -0.98 -1.02 0.49 0.60
z-Statistics 0.31 0.58 -0.87 -1.18 -0.57 0.45
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent differences from the average of peers.
(2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. Table 9. OLS Regression Results for the Change in Bank Characteristics after M&As
Panel A. Change in ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 1.132 1.299 b 1.369 a
(3.285) (0.505) (0.304)
Relative health 0.746 0.144 0.645 a
(0.570) (0.269) (0.174)
Relative size -0.890 -1.189 0.450
(1.112) (1.006) (1.088)
Acquirer's performance -1.212 -0.906 -0.622
(1.378) (0.846) (0.659)
Target's performance -0.356 -1.518 a -1.346 a
(3.160) (0.549) (0.296)
Acquirer's health -0.121 0.115 -0.024
(0.276) (0.189) (0.160)
Target's health 0.625 0.083 -0.522 a
(0.537) (0.277) (0.162)
Herfindahl index 0.693 1.210 0.964 0.912 0.334 0.884 0.316 -0.220
(1.919) (1.718) (1.703) (1.779) (1.976) (1.944) (1.760) (2.028)
Market share -0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Prefectural GDP -0.240 -0.197 -0.118 -0.064 0.006 -0.129 -0.179 -0.150
(0.194) (0.169) (0.153) (0.159) (0.189) (0.175) (0.158) (0.186)
Size 0.006 0.000 -0.008 -0.011 -0.019 -0.006 -0.008 -0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Cons 3.751 3.205 1.803 1.004 0.163 1.918 2.846 2.672
(3.350) (2.886) (2.579) (2.682) (3.238) (2.988) (2.658) (3.171)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.249 0.232 0.236 0.167 -0.028 0.224 0.244 0.119
Panel B. Change in cost ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -13.297 0.433 -1.493
(20.409) (3.171) (1.947)
Relative health 0.816 -2.146 -1.479
(3.542) (1.686) (1.053)
Relative size 10.620 10.049 7.245
(6.911) (6.311) (5.969)
Acquirer's performance -5.536 -10.716 b -9.089 b
(8.562) (5.189) (4.131)
Target's performance -15.697 -3.307 0.884
(19.629) (3.367) (1.855)
Acquirer's health 0.427 0.846 -0.647
(1.716) (1.158) (0.950)
Target's health 3.552 2.353 1.284
(3.334) (1.702) (0.964)
Herfindahl index -9.721 -12.339 -10.073 -10.640 -10.419 -9.397 -16.332 -11.927
(11.924) (10.783) (10.918) (10.795) (10.836) (11.930) (11.028) (12.068)
Market share -0.002 -0.008 -0.067 -0.058 -0.042 -0.046 -0.033 -0.056
(0.096) (0.095) (0.092) (0.091) (0.094) (0.090) (0.091) (0.093)
Prefectural GDP -0.269 -0.362 -1.001 -1.008 -0.650 -1.047 -1.566 -1.185
(1.207) (1.063) (0.980) (0.962) (1.034) (1.072) (0.987) (1.105)
Size -0.129 -0.178 b -0.110 -0.113 -0.146 -0.060 -0.104 -0.102
(0.087) (0.086) (0.076) (0.074) (0.083) (0.077) (0.073) (0.075)
Cons 4.650 7.781 18.995 19.488 11.752 18.668 28.513 c 22.286
(20.815) (18.115) (16.532) (16.273) (17.757) (18.340) (16.653) (18.873)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.092 0.053 0.017 0.039 0.031 0.084 0.070 0.023
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 9. Continued from previous page)
Panel C. Change in X-efficiency
(1) (2) (3)
Relative efficiency 1.660 0.854 c
(1.419) (0.429)
Acquirer's efficiency 0.010 0.500 c
(0.496) (0.268)
Target's efficiency 1.160 -0.446
(1.463) (0.508)
Herfindahl index 0.142 0.153 0.164
(0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
Market share 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prefectural GDP 0.026 a 0.025 a 0.028 a
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cons -0.433 a -0.416 a -0.474 a
(0.160) (0.155) (0.156)
Obs 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.143 0.147 0.138
Panel D. Change in interest rates of deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 0.210 -0.106 -0.065 c
(0.418) (0.066) (0.039)
Relative health 0.086 0.031 -0.016
(0.073) (0.035) (0.022)
Relative size 0.063 -0.041 -0.109
(0.142) (0.130) (0.123)
Acquirer's performance 0.152 0.201 c 0.130
(0.175) (0.106) (0.083)
Target's performance 0.323 0.110 0.075 b
(0.402) (0.068) (0.037)
Acquirer's health -0.055 -0.028 0.000
(0.035) (0.024) (0.020)
Target's health 0.058 -0.016 0.024
(0.068) (0.035) (0.020)
Herfindahl index -0.159 -0.083 -0.097 -0.082 -0.055 -0.127 0.005 -0.045
(0.244) (0.223) (0.219) (0.224) (0.223) (0.243) (0.222) (0.248)
Market share 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Prefectural GDP 0.061 b 0.060 a 0.062 a 0.058 a 0.051 b 0.060 a 0.072 a 0.063 a
(0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023)
Size -0.004 b -0.003 c -0.003 b -0.003 b -0.002 -0.004 b -0.004 b -0.003 c
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Cons -0.882 b -0.874 b -0.904 a -0.859 b -0.724 c -0.850 b -1.069 a -0.935 b
(0.427) (0.374) (0.332) (0.337) (0.366) (0.373) (0.336) (0.388)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.207 0.158 0.174 0.142 0.145 0.212 0.214 0.142
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 9. Continued from previous page)
Panel E. Change in interest rates of loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -0.315 0.049 0.077
(0.873) (0.133) (0.079)
Relative health 0.117 0.004 0.034
(0.152) (0.071) (0.043)
Relative size 0.158 0.199 0.257
(0.296) (0.265) (0.244)
Acquirer's performance 0.049 -0.083 -0.222
(0.366) (0.216) (0.171)
Target's performance -0.266 0.017 -0.083
(0.840) (0.140) (0.077)
Acquirer's health -0.100 -0.057 -0.068 c
(0.073) (0.048) (0.038)
Target's health 0.050 -0.050 -0.041
(0.143) (0.071) (0.038)
Herfindahl index -0.928 c -0.467 -0.431 -0.436 -0.498 -0.898 c -0.602 -0.887 c
(0.510) (0.453) (0.444) (0.446) (0.444) (0.498) (0.458) (0.479)
Market share 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Prefectural GDP -0.078 -0.028 -0.042 -0.039 -0.020 -0.083 c -0.057 -0.084 c
(0.052) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.044)
Size -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cons 1.379 0.508 0.761 0.715 0.398 1.497 c 1.020 1.509 b
(0.890) (0.761) (0.673) (0.672) (0.727) (0.765) (0.691) (0.750)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq -0.062 -0.068 -0.041 -0.047 -0.038 -0.018 -0.023 0.015
Panel F. Change in capital ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 9.152 b 1.779 b 2.061 a
(4.400) (0.675) (0.422)
Relative health 0.259 0.436 1.056 a
(0.764) (0.359) (0.237)
Relative size -2.015 -2.990 b -0.380
(1.490) (1.343) (1.548)
Acquirer's performance -1.057 1.999 c 2.174 b
(1.846) (1.191) (0.925)
Target's performance 7.024 -1.719 b -1.843 a
(4.232) (0.773) (0.415)
Acquirer's health 0.060 0.058 0.313
(0.370) (0.266) (0.220)
Target's health 0.063 -0.083 -0.854 a
(0.719) (0.391) (0.223)
Herfindahl index 2.572 2.110 1.478 1.468 0.670 2.807 2.721 1.601
(2.571) (2.295) (2.367) (2.427) (2.811) (2.739) (2.470) (2.797)
Market share -0.003 -0.006 0.011 0.009 0.019 0.004 0.004 0.011
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Prefectural GDP -0.419 -0.586 a -0.390 c -0.315 -0.269 -0.266 -0.280 -0.258
(0.260) (0.226) (0.213) (0.216) (0.268) (0.246) (0.221) (0.256)
Size 0.029 0.031 c 0.011 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.008 -0.003
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Cons 5.649 8.531 b 5.056 3.893 3.821 2.986 3.235 3.157
(4.487) (3.855) (3.585) (3.659) (4.606) (4.211) (3.730) (4.373)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.371 0.361 0.311 0.276 0.029 0.281 0.305 0.219
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 9. Continued from previous page)
Panel G. Change in bad loan ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -8.812 0.074 -3.890 a
(13.630) (2.365) (1.041)
Relative health -0.084 -3.024 b -2.953 a
(2.704) (1.460) (0.633)
Relative size -2.471 0.488 -6.011
(5.723) (4.859) (5.254)
Acquirer's performance 3.343 0.642 -5.158 b
(5.206) (2.903) (2.484)
Target's performance -7.809 0.530 3.531 a
(12.597) (1.777) (0.995)
Acquirer's health -2.794 b -2.531 a -2.424 a
(1.307) (0.902) (0.660)
Target's health 1.963 2.334 b 2.553 a
(2.169) (1.054) (0.481)
Herfindahl index -15.051 1.022 1.870 0.930 3.014 -12.614 -2.686 -11.992
(9.860) (7.160) (7.442) (6.806) (9.118) (8.359) (7.688) (7.916)
Market share -0.047 -0.095 -0.112 c -0.096 c -0.141 c -0.038 -0.084 -0.039
(0.061) (0.058) (0.060) (0.056) (0.073) (0.056) (0.060) (0.054)
Prefectural GDP -3.021 b -1.100 -0.969 -1.126 -1.982 c -2.423 b -1.440 c -2.421 a
(1.303) (0.847) (0.787) (0.708) (0.975) (0.871) (0.834) (0.835)
Size 0.006 0.005 0.013 0.007 0.086 0.002 0.020 0.010
(0.051) (0.053) (0.048) (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.047) (0.039)
Cons 52.674 b 18.818 16.155 19.340 31.760 c 42.029 b 24.091 c 41.750 a
(22.978) (14.627) (13.284) (11.996) (16.992) (15.037) (14.045) (14.408)
Obs 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Adjusted R-sq 0.488 0.428 0.369 0.474 0.065 0.545 0.405 0.579
Panel H. Change in new bad loan ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 34.491 -0.459 -4.559
(46.567) (6.425) (4.186)
Relative health -7.104 -1.363 -1.074
(10.022) (2.919) (2.163)
Relative size -14.762 -11.102 -10.788
(13.523) (9.973) (7.394)
Acquirer's performance -18.200 -12.568 -9.027 c
(13.844) (6.949) (4.978)
Target's performance 32.715 6.098 5.025
(40.538) (4.811) (3.626)
Acquirer's health 1.942 1.406 -0.504
(3.221) (2.073) (1.661)
Target's health -6.278 -1.412 0.934
(7.648) (2.425) (2.108)
Herfindahl index -20.618 3.908 4.303 8.679 7.110 -12.695 -17.172 5.730
(29.250) (15.323) (14.846) (14.673) (13.450) (24.784) (19.105) (23.294)
Market share -0.076 -0.262 c -0.235 -0.269 c -0.299 b -0.066 -0.046 -0.248
(0.232) (0.141) (0.133) (0.135) (0.117) (0.185) (0.169) (0.172)
Prefectural GDP -4.457 -4.167 b -3.423 b -3.523 b -4.223 b -2.836 -3.344 b -3.562
(3.032) (1.680) (1.496) (1.545) (1.511) (2.169) (1.421) (2.125)
Size 0.108 0.144 0.086 0.117 0.156 0.061 0.047 0.111
(0.148) (0.124) (0.109) (0.107) (0.102) (0.122) (0.105) (0.119)
Cons 76.871 68.255 b 54.358 b 54.347 c 67.919 b 46.717 56.234 b 55.425
(52.734) (28.260) (24.610) (25.468) (25.571) (37.598) (23.328) (36.381)
Obs 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Adjusted R-sq 0.120 0.201 0.247 0.193 0.294 0.251 0.333 0.127
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 9. Continued from previous page)
Panel I. Change in loan ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -13.337 -3.163 -1.489
(14.534) (2.211) (1.329)
Relative health 2.837 1.374 -0.108
(2.522) (1.176) (0.735)
Relative size -3.220 -2.573 -3.933
(4.921) (4.400) (4.117)
Acquirer's performance 7.182 2.638 0.709
(6.097) (3.655) (2.921)
Target's performance -8.128 4.316 c 1.513
(13.978) (2.371) (1.311)
Acquirer's health -1.935 -0.877 -0.475
(1.222) (0.815) (0.660)
Target's health 0.420 -1.520 0.196
(2.374) (1.199) (0.670)
Herfindahl index -3.179 2.834 2.084 2.618 3.230 -2.937 2.799 0.202
(8.491) (7.518) (7.454) (7.535) (7.475) (8.402) (7.797) (8.387)
Market share -0.073 -0.076 -0.058 -0.064 -0.083 -0.051 -0.062 -0.056
(0.068) (0.067) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Prefectural GDP -1.698 c -0.986 -0.851 -0.948 -1.203 c -1.238 -0.778 -1.178
(0.860) (0.741) (0.669) (0.671) (0.713) (0.755) (0.698) (0.768)
Size 0.050 0.070 0.053 0.061 0.086 0.020 0.053 0.058
(0.062) (0.060) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.055) (0.052) (0.052)
Cons 28.183 c 15.482 13.170 14.330 18.974 20.565 11.948 18.407
(14.822) (12.629) (11.286) (11.358) (12.249) (12.917) (11.774) (13.117)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.024 -0.009 0.006 -0.017 -0.033
Panel J. Change in loan growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 18.584 1.715 3.477 b
(14.793) (2.231) (1.390)
Relative health -0.880 1.885 2.228 a
(2.567) (1.186) (0.745)
Relative size -9.163 c -8.205 c -3.453
(5.009) (4.439) (4.496)
Acquirer's performance -4.032 2.762 3.603
(6.206) (3.860) (3.062)
Target's performance 17.713 0.247 -3.050 b
(14.227) (2.505) (1.375)
Acquirer's health 0.605 0.120 0.499
(1.244) (0.861) (0.675)
Target's health -3.106 -1.985 -1.961 a
(2.417) (1.266) (0.686)
Herfindahl index -10.598 -8.196 -10.073 -9.731 -11.060 -10.725 -8.039 -10.508
(8.643) (7.585) (7.795) (7.640) (8.163) (8.874) (8.175) (8.580)
Market share 0.015 0.008 0.056 0.049 0.059 0.050 0.046 0.054
(0.069) (0.067) (0.065) (0.064) (0.071) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066)
Prefectural GDP -1.468 c -1.404 c -0.887 -0.790 -0.860 -0.826 -0.701 -0.795
(0.875) (0.748) (0.700) (0.681) (0.779) (0.797) (0.732) (0.786)
Size 0.058 0.080 0.025 0.022 0.025 -0.007 0.021 -0.001
(0.063) (0.060) (0.054) (0.053) (0.062) (0.058) (0.054) (0.053)
Cons 26.425 c 24.353 c 15.286 13.544 16.487 14.828 12.214 14.115
(15.087) (12.742) (11.802) (11.516) (13.376) (13.642) (12.344) (13.417)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.107 0.123 0.062 0.099 -0.029 0.052 0.044 0.076
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. Table 10. OLS Regression Results for the Change in Bank Characteristics after M&As, Robustness Checks
Panel A. Change in ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 0.815 1.253 b 1.319 a
(2.755) (0.502) (0.301)
Relative health 0.771 0.139 0.621 a
(0.577) (0.267) (0.172)
Relative size -0.780 -1.161 0.421
(1.103) (0.997) (1.071)
Acquirer's performance -1.127 -0.968 -0.658
(1.321) (0.864) (0.658)
Target's performance -0.582 -1.514 a -1.336 a
(2.622) (0.529) (0.297)
Acquirer's health -0.130 0.125 -0.048
(0.300) (0.201) (0.166)
Target's health 0.650 0.089 -0.509 a
(0.536) (0.271) (0.165)
Herfindahl index 0.619 1.081 0.843 0.785 0.217 0.822 0.209 -0.463
(1.932) (1.708) (1.692) (1.764) (1.948) (1.941) (1.736) (2.026)
Market share -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Prefectural GDP -0.261 -0.212 -0.136 -0.084 -0.017 -0.166 -0.217 -0.176
(0.196) (0.167) (0.151) (0.156) (0.185) (0.174) (0.156) (0.186)
Size 0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.012 -0.019 -0.005 -0.007 -0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Cons 4.051 3.432 2.086 1.308 0.544 2.520 3.469 3.102
(3.377) (2.850) (2.550) (2.647) (3.174) (2.979) (2.624) (3.168)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.239 0.221 0.226 0.159 -0.028 0.221 0.241 0.110
Panel B. Change in cost ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -4.913 0.736 -1.032
(16.936) (3.132) (1.923)
Relative health 0.434 -2.050 -1.245
(3.546) (1.665) (1.042)
Relative size 12.155 c 10.187 7.864
(6.782) (6.226) (5.857)
Acquirer's performance -9.437 -11.848 b -9.536 b
(8.121) (5.281) (4.099)
Target's performance -7.777 -3.172 0.534
(16.119) (3.234) (1.850)
Acquirer's health 0.841 1.080 -0.737
(1.846) (1.229) (0.988)
Target's health 3.213 2.102 1.127
(3.295) (1.653) (0.979)
Herfindahl index -8.518 -11.189 -8.933 -9.514 -9.513 -7.919 -15.330 -11.552
(11.878) (10.661) (10.799) (10.698) (10.658) (11.857) (10.813) (12.025)
Market share 0.011 0.006 -0.053 -0.044 -0.024 -0.039 -0.019 -0.040
(0.093) (0.093) (0.090) (0.089) (0.092) (0.088) (0.088) (0.091)
Prefectural GDP -0.015 -0.163 -0.806 -0.797 -0.389 -0.865 -1.390 -1.050
(1.205) (1.045) (0.965) (0.949) (1.012) (1.064) (0.971) (1.101)
Size -0.124 -0.170 b -0.101 -0.105 -0.144 c -0.054 -0.097 -0.099
(0.085) (0.085) (0.075) (0.074) (0.081) (0.076) (0.072) (0.074)
Cons 0.709 4.855 16.091 16.360 7.859 15.917 25.782 20.543
(20.763) (17.794) (16.277) (16.054) (17.362) (18.198) (16.344) (18.799)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.082 0.031 -0.007 0.013 0.019 0.072 0.061 0.000
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 10. Continued from previous page)
Panel C. Change in X-efficiency
(1) (2) (3)
Relative efficiency 1.509 0.887 b
(1.375) (0.426)
Acquirer's efficiency 0.087 0.530 c
(0.483) (0.266)
Target's efficiency 0.994 -0.487
(1.442) (0.510)
Herfindahl index 0.133 0.144 0.154
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101)
Market share 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prefectural GDP 0.026 a 0.024 a 0.027 a
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cons -0.426 a -0.400 b -0.452 a
(0.156) (0.154) (0.155)
Obs 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.145 0.148 0.142
Panel D. Change in interest rates of deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 0.054 -0.098 -0.059
(0.358) (0.066) (0.039)
Relative health 0.087 0.031 -0.013
(0.075) (0.035) (0.022)
Relative size 0.022 -0.037 -0.097
(0.144) (0.131) (0.123)
Acquirer's performance 0.201 0.200 c 0.134
(0.172) (0.110) (0.085)
Target's performance 0.169 0.100 0.070 c
(0.341) (0.067) (0.038)
Acquirer's health -0.056 -0.027 0.005
(0.039) (0.026) (0.021)
Target's health 0.056 -0.014 0.021
(0.070) (0.034) (0.020)
Herfindahl index -0.143 -0.078 -0.091 -0.077 -0.053 -0.116 0.007 -0.018
(0.251) (0.224) (0.220) (0.224) (0.223) (0.247) (0.223) (0.250)
Market share 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Prefectural GDP 0.061 b 0.062 a 0.063 a 0.060 a 0.053 b 0.063 a 0.074 a 0.066 a
(0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023)
Size -0.004 c -0.003 -0.003 b -0.003 c -0.002 -0.004 b -0.003 b -0.003 c
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Cons -0.889 b -0.911 b -0.935 a -0.894 a -0.776 b -0.920 b -1.115 a -1.005 b
(0.439) (0.374) (0.332) (0.336) (0.364) (0.380) (0.337) (0.391)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.176 0.144 0.161 0.134 0.138 0.191 0.200 0.133
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 10. Continued from previous page)
Panel E. Change in interest rates of loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -0.763 0.056 0.083
(0.713) (0.131) (0.078)
Relative health 0.162 0.000 0.035
(0.149) (0.069) (0.043)
Relative size 0.267 0.222 0.285
(0.286) (0.260) (0.240)
Acquirer's performance 0.315 0.010 -0.185
(0.342) (0.219) (0.171)
Target's performance -0.680 0.014 -0.092
(0.679) (0.134) (0.077)
Acquirer's health -0.147 c -0.079 -0.077 c
(0.078) (0.051) (0.039)
Target's health 0.080 -0.052 -0.047
(0.139) (0.069) (0.038)
Herfindahl index -1.042 b -0.492 -0.452 -0.459 -0.525 -0.969 c -0.590 -0.958 b
(0.500) (0.445) (0.437) (0.439) (0.436) (0.492) (0.451) (0.472)
Market share 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Prefectural GDP -0.096 c -0.031 -0.047 -0.043 -0.023 -0.093 b -0.061 -0.093 b
(0.051) (0.044) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040) (0.043)
Size -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cons 1.706 c 0.570 0.846 0.796 0.452 1.680 b 1.089 1.674 b
(0.875) (0.742) (0.659) (0.659) (0.710) (0.755) (0.681) (0.738)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq -0.018 -0.054 -0.031 -0.039 -0.026 0.003 -0.020 0.038
Panel F. Change in capital ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 8.088 b 1.634 b 1.918 a
(3.655) (0.665) (0.417)
Relative health 0.041 0.442 0.997 a
(0.765) (0.353) (0.232)
Relative size -3.132 b -3.051 b -0.589
(1.464) (1.322) (1.502)
Acquirer's performance -1.303 1.590 2.104 b
(1.753) (1.211) (0.921)
Target's performance 5.994 c -1.710 b -1.748 a
(3.479) (0.742) (0.416)
Acquirer's health 0.306 0.188 0.389 c
(0.398) (0.282) (0.227)
Target's health -0.103 -0.055 -0.806 a
(0.711) (0.379) (0.225)
Herfindahl index 3.313 1.935 1.295 1.288 0.542 3.082 2.461 1.887
(2.564) (2.263) (2.344) (2.386) (2.733) (2.720) (2.431) (2.759)
Market share -0.013 -0.013 0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.005 -0.003 0.003
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Prefectural GDP -0.391 -0.634 a -0.436 b -0.366 c -0.338 -0.287 -0.353 -0.255
(0.260) (0.222) (0.210) (0.212) (0.259) (0.244) (0.218) (0.253)
Size 0.027 0.028 0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.007 -0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Cons 5.131 9.372 b 5.887 4.798 5.030 3.378 4.565 3.106
(4.481) (3.778) (3.533) (3.580) (4.452) (4.174) (3.674) (4.314)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.355 0.341 0.285 0.259 0.027 0.264 0.284 0.205
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 10. Continued from previous page)
Panel G. Change in bad loan ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -11.521 0.154 -3.775 a
(11.232) (2.363) (1.041)
Relative health -0.115 -3.012 b -2.884 a
(2.616) (1.458) (0.633)
Relative size -1.437 0.645 -5.675
(5.348) (4.859) (5.212)
Acquirer's performance 4.477 0.783 -4.949 c
(4.681) (2.922) (2.542)
Target's performance -10.274 0.392 3.446 a
(10.175) (1.746) (1.022)
Acquirer's health -2.896 b -2.505 b -2.371 a
(1.257) (0.901) (0.666)
Target's health 1.795 2.405 b 2.549 a
(2.118) (1.050) (0.499)
Herfindahl index -15.872 1.018 1.808 0.901 2.989 -11.936 -2.237 -11.394
(9.750) (7.168) (7.457) (6.821) (9.060) (8.418) (7.777) (7.984)
Market share -0.048 -0.093 -0.110 c -0.094 -0.139 c -0.037 -0.082 -0.038
(0.060) (0.058) (0.060) (0.055) (0.073) (0.056) (0.061) (0.054)
Prefectural GDP -3.225 b -1.125 -1.003 -1.156 -1.976 c -2.330 b -1.382 -2.327 b
(1.276) (0.845) (0.785) (0.706) (0.966) (0.883) (0.845) (0.846)
Size 0.010 0.007 0.016 0.010 0.086 0.002 0.017 0.008
(0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.044) (0.059) (0.045) (0.048) (0.040)
Cons 56.196 b 19.062 16.556 19.687 31.483 c 40.243 b 22.796 39.965 b
(22.543) (14.604) (13.244) (11.961) (16.819) (15.231) (14.215) (14.591)
Obs 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Adjusted R-sq 0.491 0.419 0.358 0.465 0.064 0.529 0.381 0.565
Panel H. Change in new bad loan ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 34.087 -0.024 -4.290
(43.535) (6.531) (4.260)
Relative health -7.235 -1.414 -0.996
(9.992) (2.956) (2.185)
Relative size -19.421 -11.488 -10.809
(15.299) (10.120) (7.472)
Acquirer's performance -17.880 -12.840 c -9.186 c
(12.844) (7.007) (5.145)
Target's performance 30.927 5.457 4.456
(36.587) (4.863) (3.777)
Acquirer's health 1.690 1.473 -0.444
(3.099) (2.066) (1.683)
Target's health -6.158 -1.429 0.637
(7.495) (2.433) (2.159)
Herfindahl index -22.214 3.970 4.261 8.473 6.779 -12.098 -16.894 5.966
(29.748) (15.582) (15.133) (14.858) (13.616) (25.237) (19.480) (23.539)
Market share -0.064 -0.261 c -0.231 -0.264 c -0.293 b -0.064 -0.042 -0.250
(0.234) (0.143) (0.135) (0.136) (0.118) (0.189) (0.173) (0.172)
Prefectural GDP -4.668 -4.152 b -3.377 b -3.474 b -4.172 b -2.748 -3.285 b -3.578
(3.037) (1.702) (1.517) (1.559) (1.524) (2.216) (1.459) (2.195)
Size 0.090 0.143 0.082 0.112 0.150 0.054 0.039 0.106
(0.151) (0.125) (0.110) (0.108) (0.103) (0.126) (0.109) (0.120)
Cons 80.567 67.713 b 53.294 c 53.255 c 66.812 b 44.764 54.842 b 55.211
(53.034) (28.543) (24.857) (25.605) (25.729) (38.336) (23.809) (37.568)
Obs 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Adjusted R-sq 0.103 0.177 0.222 0.174 0.277 0.221 0.302 0.101
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. (Table 10. Continued from previous page)
Panel I. Change in loan ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance -10.473 -3.146 -1.479
(12.424) (2.232) (1.339)
Relative health 2.511 1.340 -0.116
(2.601) (1.186) (0.741)
Relative size -2.123 -2.207 -3.602
(4.975) (4.437) (4.148)
Acquirer's performance 6.865 2.929 0.844
(5.957) (3.816) (2.975)
Target's performance -5.145 4.301 c 1.522
(11.825) (2.337) (1.343)
Acquirer's health -1.983 -0.940 -0.420
(1.354) (0.888) (0.701)
Target's health 0.073 -1.555 0.139
(2.417) (1.195) (0.695)
Herfindahl index -4.402 2.420 1.748 2.292 2.858 -3.487 2.526 0.181
(8.714) (7.597) (7.521) (7.600) (7.548) (8.570) (7.849) (8.535)
Market share -0.067 -0.076 -0.059 -0.066 -0.083 -0.047 -0.063 -0.059
(0.068) (0.067) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Prefectural GDP -1.822 b -1.073 -0.965 -1.061 -1.293 c -1.305 c -0.865 -1.272
(0.884) (0.745) (0.672) (0.674) (0.717) (0.769) (0.705) (0.782)
Size 0.043 0.065 0.050 0.058 0.082 0.016 0.049 0.056
(0.062) (0.060) (0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
Cons 31.236 b 17.665 15.857 16.989 21.190 c 22.408 c 14.169 20.690
(15.232) (12.680) (11.335) (11.405) (12.296) (13.152) (11.863) (13.343)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq -0.009 -0.005 0.003 -0.017 -0.005 0.011 -0.011 -0.029
Panel J. Change in loan growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative performance 13.162 1.549 3.227 b
(12.260) (2.180) (1.362)
Relative health -0.712 1.838 2.104 a
(2.567) (1.159) (0.730)
Relative size -11.078 b -8.321 c -3.823
(4.909) (4.335) (4.370)
Acquirer's performance -2.345 2.850 3.500
(5.879) (3.912) (3.024)
Target's performance 12.410 0.020 -2.937 b
(11.669) (2.396) (1.365)
Acquirer's health 0.527 0.059 0.482
(1.337) (0.911) (0.696)
Target's health -2.939 -1.831 -1.903 a
(2.385) (1.225) (0.690)
Herfindahl index -10.761 -8.938 -10.814 -10.475 -11.712 -11.565 -8.882 -11.276
(8.599) (7.422) (7.645) (7.490) (7.951) (8.785) (7.978) (8.469)
Market share 0.010 0.004 0.052 0.045 0.053 0.049 0.041 0.052
(0.067) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064)
Prefectural GDP -1.525 c -1.496 b -0.977 -0.887 -0.989 -0.928 -0.839 -0.881
(0.872) (0.728) (0.683) (0.665) (0.755) (0.789) (0.716) (0.776)
Size 0.056 0.076 0.020 0.018 0.024 -0.005 0.020 0.000
(0.062) (0.059) (0.053) (0.051) (0.061) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052)
Cons 27.658 c 26.371 b 17.307 15.665 19.127 17.018 15.118 16.026
(15.031) (12.389) (11.522) (11.240) (12.953) (13.483) (12.058) (13.239)
Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adjusted R-sq 0.101 0.123 0.058 0.096 -0.020 0.049 0.045 0.074
Notes: 
1) Standard errors are in parentheses. 











































































































































































Bad loan ratio= ×100
Loans outstanding
Increase in non performing lo










Loan growth=Growth rate of loans outstanding×100
Size=ln(Total assets)






                           
00
Herfindahl index= Prefectual herfindahl index calculated by deposits outstanding of shinkin banks
Market share= Each shinkin bank's deposits outstanding as a proportion to 
•
•
 total deposits outstanding of the shinkin banks within the same prefecture×100
Target's assets























• cquirer's capital ratio
Target's assets
Target's health= ×Target's capital ratio
Acquirer's assets+Target's assets
•
 Appendix 2. Estimation of X-efficiency 
 
To estimate the X-efficiency of the shinkin banks, we first formulate the standard translog cost 
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TC :Total cost= Interest on deposits+Personnel expenditure+Nonpersonnel expenditure
y :Output 1= Loans outstanding
y :Output 2=Cash+Deposit paid+Securities
Interest on deposits






p : Input price 2=
Employee number 
Nonpersonnel expenditure
p : Input price 3=
Movable and immovable assets 
x : X -efficiency factor
u : Random error
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Interest on deposits Personnel expenditure Nonpersonnel expenditure
S : , S : , S :
TC TC TC
  We estimate the translog cost function (1) and the cost share equations (2) by the 
method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), applying the following homogeneity 
and symmetry restrictions (3).   
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Symmetry : = , =
Homogeneity :  =1,  =0  for all h,  =0  for all k
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Estimation results are represented at A2-1. Here we define the residuals of estimation 
 as the X-efficiency measure. Peristiani (1997) indicates that residual 
can be transformed so that the minimum is zero, that is, 
ln( ) it it it ex =+ u
ˆ ˆˆ min{ } it it it ee ε = − . By taking 
the exponential, we finally obtain the following modified X-efficiency measure. 
 
ˆ exp( ). it it XEFF ε =                                                   ( 4 )  
 
 A2-2 indicates the correlation matrix of X-efficiency measure and the profitability 
variables, ROA and cost ratio. X-efficiency has positive correlation with ROA, and 
negative correlation with cost ratio. This result can be considered quite reasonable. A2-1. Estimation Results
Coef. Coef.
lnTC S1
lny1 0.410 a lnp1 0.000 a
(0.042) (0.000)
lny2 0.812 a lnp2 0.000 a
(0.052) (0.000)
lny1*lny1 0.002 c lnp3 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
lny1*lny2 0.000 a lny1 -0.018 a
(0.000) (0.001)
lny2*lny2 -0.005 a lny2 0.035 a
(0.001) (0.001)










lnp1*lnp3 0.000 lnp1 0.000 a
(0.000) (0.000)
lnp2*lnp2 0.000 a lnp2 0.000 a
(0.000) (0.000)
lnp2*lnp3 0.000 b lnp3 0.000 a
(0.000) (0.000)
lnp3*lnp3 0.000 a lny1 0.012 a
(0.000) (0.001)
lny1*lnp1 -0.018 a lny2 -0.027 a
(0.001) 0.001

















 A2-2. Correlation Matrix of X-efficiency and Profitability 
X-efficiency ROA Cost ratio
X-efficiency 1.000
ROA 0.039 1.000
Cost ratio -0.141 -0.291 1.000
 
Appendix 3. Changes in Major Components of the Cost Ratio after M&As 
A3. Improvement of major components of the cost ratio after M&As: Weighted average
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 Average
Personnel expenditure ratio
Pre-merger -0.34 -0.04 0.19 0.16 0.19 -0.34
Post-merger (t years after) -1.95 -0.98 -1.31 -0.82 -1.41 -2.21
Diff -1.61 -0.94 -1.49 -0.97 -1.61 -1.87
t-Statistics -3.05 a -1.52 -2.00 c -1.58 -1.69 -3.50 a
z-Statistics -2.28 b -1.28 -2.04 b -1.42 -1.62 -3.08 a
Nonpersonnel expenditure ratio
Pre-merger 0.32 0.33 0.41 0.37 0.42 0.32
Post-merger (t years after) 0.30 0.39 0.14 0.56 0.70 0.37
Diff -0.01 0.06 -0.27 0.19 0.28 0.06
t-Statistics -0.05 0.16 -0.76 0.52 0.58 0.20
z-Statistics -0.54 -0.11 -0.88 0.73 0.94 -0.09
Taxes
Pre-merger 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.11
Post-merger (t years after) 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.14
Diff 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.04
t-Statistics 0.18 1.85 c 0.27 0.92 1.08 1.16
z-Statistics -0.32 1.74 c -0.07 0.95 0.55 0.62
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent differences from the average of peers.














 Appendix 4. Changes in Major Components of the Capital Ratio after M&As 
A4. Improvement of major components of the capital ratio after M&As: Weighted average
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 Average
Invest in capital ratio
Pre-merger 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Post-merger (t years after) 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13
Diff 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.10
t-Statistics 2.99 a 2.45 b 2.92 a 2.55 b 2.53 b 3.60 a
z-Statistics 2.10 b 2.45 b 2.85 a 2.15 b 1.99 b 2.84 a
Special reserve ratio
Pre-merger -0.77 -0.74 -0.56 -0.48 -0.57 -0.77
Post-merger (t years after) -1.33 -1.45 -1.40 -1.32 -1.40 -1.40
Diff -0.56 -0.71 -0.84 -0.84 -0.83 -0.63
t-Statistics -4.17 a -4.70 a -4.14 a -3.23 a -2.57 b -4.42 a
z-Statistics -3.68 a -3.86 a -3.13 a -2.45 b -1.89 c -3.61 a
Unappropiated profit ratio
Pre-merger -0.19 -0.20 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.19
Post-merger (t years after) -0.04 -0.28 -0.18 -0.07 -0.18 -0.19
Diff 0.15 -0.08 -0.10 0.00 -0.11 0.00
t-Statistics 1.70 c -0.26 -1.40 -0.05 -1.18 -0.02
z-Statistics 1.61 1.56 -1.17 0.17 -0.67 1.25
Notes: 
(1) The numbers represent differences from the average of peers.
(2) a, b, and c represent significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Appendix 5. Method of Constructing New Peers 
 
First we classify definitely predicting acquirers and targets using the estimation results 
in Table 3. Let   be the estimated probability of each banks to become acquirer and 
 be those to become target. The standard errors of the difference in these two 
predictions are depicted by (See, e.g., Stata, 2005), 
ˆ A p
ˆT p

















We consider the banks with   as definitely predicting acquirers, those with 
 as definitely predicting targets, and others as ambiguous. The two way table 
of the frequency of predicted and observed outcomes are shown in A4. And we define 
control peer groups as those which suffice following two conditions: (1) those banks 
which classified as definitely predicting acquirers or targets, and (2) those banks which 
have not got involved in any merger or acquisition throughout all the sample period. 
Finally we obtain different two control peer groups for the acquirer and target 
96 . 1 > z
96 . 1 < zrespectively, and we can then take the weighted average of characteristics variable of 
control peer banks. 
 





Peer 1,026 2,911 3,598 7,535
Target 57 41 11 109
Acquirer 5 37 75 117
Total 1,088 2,989 3,684 7,761
 